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The theoretical analysis shows that in an economy with an infinitely
large number of donors, impurely altruistic preferences lead to either
asymptotically zero or complete crowd-out. The paper then establishes
conditions on preferences that are sufficient to yield zero crowd-out
in the limit. These conditions are fairly weak and quite plausible. An
empirical representation of the model is estimated using a new
1986–92 panel of donations and government funding from the United
States to 125 international relief and development organizations. Be-
sides directly linking sources of public and private support, the econ-
ometric analysis controls for unobserved institution-specific factors,
institution-specific changes in leadership, year-to-year changes in
need, and expenditures by related organizations. The estimates show
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sources. Thus, at the margin, donations to these organizations appear
to be motivated solely by joy-of-giving preferences. In addition to ad-
dressing the basic question of motives behind charitable giving, the
results help explain the existing disparity between econometric and
experimental crowd-out estimates.
I. Introduction
A fundamental question in public economics concerns the motivations
underlying voluntary donations to charitable activities and other forms
of charitable behavior. One hypothesis is that donors are motivated by
altruistic concern over the well-being of the recipients of charity. While
reasonable on its face, this hypothesis implies that recipients’ well-being
is a public good among other individuals who are similarly motivated
(Hochman and Rodgers 1969; Warr 1982; Roberts 1984) and that char-
itable contributions are subject to the strong neutrality results of public-
goods models. The neutrality results include complete dollar-for-dollar
crowd-out of private contributions when similarly directed government
funding increases, no change in aggregate donations when income is
redistributed among contributors, and a decline in the percentage of
the population who contribute as the size of the population grows (see,
e.g., Sugden 1982; Warr 1982, 1983; Roberts 1984; Andreoni 1988).
Noting that people may derive private enjoyment from the act of giving
itself, several authors have proposed combining a “joy-of-giving” motive
with altruism to create a model of impure altruism (Cornes and Sandler
1984, 1994; Steinberg 1987; Andreoni 1989, 1990). The attractiveness
of the impurely altruistic model is that it is thought to avoid the strong
neutrality results of purely altruistic models.1
Empirical research has used a variety of sources including individual-
level cross-section, aggregate time-series, and experimental data to mea-
sure the extent of crowd-out and interpreted the resulting estimates as
providing evidence about the relative strengths of the impurely altruistic
model’s two components. Unfortunately, the alternative empirical ap-
proaches have generated divergent findings. On the one hand, econ-
ometric crowd-out analyses of cross-section tax return and survey data
suggest a weak to moderate altruistic component in giving (see Stein-
1 Theorists have examined other extensions that weaken the neutrality results. For in-
stance, Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) showed that the neutrality results may not
obtain if some people are at corner solutions at which they donate nothing. Their result
was contradicted, however, by Andreoni (1988), who found that crowding out is asymp-
totically complete as the number of donors rises. A small crowd-out response (more
accurately, an income effect) will also occur if an increase in government expenditures
is financed by an increase in taxes, which reduces disposable income available for private
giving.
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berg’s [1991] review). On the other hand, public-goods experiments
(Andreoni 1993; Bolton and Katok 1998) and historical accounts of the
decline in private social welfare contributions that accompanied the rise
in publicly funded poverty relief in the United States during the 1930s
(Roberts 1984) provide evidence of sizable crowd-out effects and a
strong altruistic component. Researchers have not been able to rec-
oncile the stark differences in results and have instead focused on the
methodological shortcomings of each approach. Little consideration has
been given to the possibility that the cross-section, time-series, and ex-
perimental results are all essentially correct and consistent with a more
careful analysis of the impurely altruistic model.
This study attempts to provide a positive reconciliation. It first con-
ducts a theoretical analysis that shows that impurely altruistic models,
which predict incomplete crowd-out effects among individual or small
groups of donors (as in the experimental studies), may well produce
asymptotically zero crowd-out effects as the number of donors becomes
large (as in the cross-section econometric studies). The analysis also
shows that asymptotically complete crowd-out may occur under a rea-
sonable set of circumstances. However, asymptotically incomplete crowd-
out, which impurely altruistic models are widely thought to predict,
occurs only under knife-edge conditions. Which of the likely asymptotic
predictions, complete or zero crowd-out, actually obtains depends on
the relative strength of two opposing forces. First, when individuals’
altruistic motives are held constant, crowd-out becomes increasingly
strong as the number of donors grows. Second, however, altruism be-
comes a weaker motive for each individual donor to the extent that
additional donors provide more of the public good and each donor’s
marginal utility of the public good declines. Somewhat unexpectedly,
for a wide class of utility functions—including those typically used by
economists—the marginal utility of the public good declines fast enough
so that the second force overwhelms the first. If real-world preferences
fall within this class of utility functions, econometric analyses of situa-
tions with many donors would find zero crowd-out.2
The study then extends its theoretical model to include several fea-
tures relevant to empirical work, most importantly by considering gifts
to multiple organizations that provide similar, though slightly differ-
entiated, charitable services.3 The extended model is estimated using a
2 There have been several interesting theoretical extensions of the impurely altruistic
model (e.g., Dasgupta and Itaya 1992; Ihori 1992; Vicary 1997), but none of them have
attempted to explain the very low econometric estimates of crowd-out or the disparity
between these estimates and the experimental evidence.
3 Theoretical analyses by Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Rose-Ackerman (1986) considered
private contributions to multiple charitable goods. We are unaware of any empirical in-
vestigations of such models.
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new 1986–92 panel of private donations and government funding from
the United States to 125 international relief and development organi-
zations. Because it is unlikely that U.S. residents will materially benefit
from their gifts to these organizations, we can directly interpret our tests
for public-good crowd-out in these data as tests for altruistic prefer-
ences.4 Besides the measures of public and private support, the data
include information on the organizations’ fund-raising, administrative
overhead, service activities, regions of operation, and leadership. With
these data, the study conducts crowd-out tests while simultaneously ad-
dressing a number of important statistical issues.
First, by using administrative data with the organization as the unit
of analysis, we are able to precisely measure and match private and
public financing to provide the same public good. Second, the panel
nature of the data allows us to include fixed effects in our econometric
models to mitigate possible biases from unobservable organization-spe-
cific factors that may affect both public and private support. Third, we
use the activity and region data to create time-varying controls for
changes in need among the organizations’ beneficiaries. We also use
these data to construct measures of similarity between the outputs of
organizations, which, in turn, enable us to examine whether donations
to one organization are crowded out by expenditures from other or-
ganizations with similar program agendas. Previous studies have been
criticized for failing to include adequate controls for need and other
types of support. Finally, we use the data on changes in the organizations’
chief executives to control for time-varying leadership effects. They are
intended to mitigate biases caused by internal shifts within organizations
that may generate comovements in contributions and government sup-
port (e.g., a new leader who alters the organization’s mission in a way
that induces additional support from donors and the government).
The study’s empirical results show little evidence of crowd-out from
either direct public or related private sources. Thus, at the margin,
charitable contributions appear to reflect joy-of-giving motivations. The
empirical findings are robust to the econometric issues we have just
described and to alternative assumptions regarding the amount of in-
4 Most previous research has considered contributions to domestic religious,educational,
cultural, health, and human service nonprofits. It is probable that contributions to these
groups are at least partially motivated by donors’ preferences for their own actual or
potential future consumption of the goods and services provided by the organizations
and, consequently, that tests of public-good crowd-out based on these data do not entirely
reflect preferences for altruism (for supporting evidence, see Biddle [1992] and Salamon
[1992]). In an earlier paper (Ribar and Wilhelm 1995), we examined state-level data on
contributions to a small set of international relief and development organizations but
focused on tax price and income effects and configured the data so as to eliminate possible
biases from government crowd-out; Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler (1995) also examined
a small number of U.K.-based international relief and development organizations.
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formation donors might reasonably be expected to possess before mak-
ing their contribution decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II ex-
amines the asymptotic properties of impurely altruistic models and de-
scribes extensions of the model for purposes of estimation. Section III
reviews previous empirical research. The data for estimation are de-
scribed in Section IV. Section V describes the econometric methodology
and reports our empirical findings. Conclusions as well as additional
implications of our results are presented in Section VI.
II. The Model
A. The Limits of Impure Altruism: Asymptotic Crowd-Out
Consider an impurely altruistic model of charitable giving with N donors
in which the ith donor’s utility is defined over her own consumption,
ci, the utility of a representative beneficiary served by charitable insti-
tution H, and the size of i’s contribution to H, hi. The second preference
component is a public good because other donors also care about the
well-being of those whom the charity serves. Unable to measure this
well-being directly, we assume that donors’ concerns can be adequately
captured by the expenditures H makes on services for the beneficiaries.
We further simplify by assuming that the organization’s expenditures
on services exactly equal the contributions it receives (this will be sub-
sequently relaxed). The third component of utility arises from the pri-
vate joy of giving or “warm glow” i experiences when making her gift.
The ith donor selects nonnegative levels of consumption and contri-
butions to maximize a utility function
˜Up U(c , H, h ) (1)i i i
subject to the budget constraint
c  h p y  t, (2)i i i i
where yi is income and ti is a lump-sum tax paid to the government.
Donor i’s contribution combines with the gifts of others, Hi, and fund-
ing from the government, HG, to form total contributions to the insti-
tution, :˜H
˜Hp h H H p HH . (3)i i G G
The budget constraint (2) can be rewritten by adding toH Hi G
both sides of the equation
˜c Hp Z , Z { y  t H H , (4)i i i i i i G
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where Zi can be interpreted as the donor’s “social income.” We shall
sometimes use to represent i’s disposable income.x p y  ti i i
Using (3) to substitute for hi and (4) to represent the budget con-
straint, we can rewrite the donor’s maximization problem in terms of
This yields the interior first-order condition˜H.
˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜ ˜U Z H, H, H (H H ) U Z H, H, H (H H )ic i i G iH i i G
˜ ˜ ˜ U Z H, H, H (H H )p 0. (5)ih i i G
The first-order condition leads to implicit demand functions for the
total provision of the public good,
∗˜H p q(Z , H H ), (6)i i i G
to which the donor’s optimal contribution is
∗h p q(Z , H H )H H (7)i i i i G i G
with the corresponding differentials
∗dh p q (dy  dt  dH  dH ) q (dH  dH )i i1 i i i G i2 i G
 dH  dH . (8)i G
Andreoni (1989, 1990) has provided the intuition relating notions of
altruism and the joy of giving to the partial derivatives of Theq(7, 7).i
partial derivatives qi1 and qi2 together reflect the altruistic and joy-of-
giving components of benevolence. If the donor is motivated purely by
altruism, then and and changes in the contributions ofq 1 0 q p 0,i1 i2
others, generate the largest amount of crowd-out. In con-dH  dH ,i G
trast, if the donor is motivated only by the joy of giving, then q i1
and changes in the contributions of others have no effect onq p 1,i2
giving. Finally, the gifts of impure altruists are influenced by both com-
ponents such that and 5q 1 0, q 1 0, q  q ! 1.i1 i2 i1 i2
To examine how aggregate private gifts respond to government fund-
5 The last inequality presumes normality of own consumption and donations with respect
to the contributions of others ( ). Cornes and Sandler (1994) have provided aH Hi G
detailed analysis of the comparative statics of the impure altruism model and have con-
sidered the theoretical possibilities of crowd-in (in the present notation, ) andq  q 1 1i1 i2
super-crowd-out ( ). Our subsequent discussion of crowding out as the numberq  q ! 0i1 i2
of impure altruists increases holds for either of these two cases. That is, we need not
assume normality. However, the extension of our results to heterogeneous agents will
require that be bounded.q  qi1 i2
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ing, we follow Sugden (1982) and Andreoni (1988, 1989, 1990) by sum-
ming equation (8) over all donors and solving for dH:
N Nq 1 (q  q )i1 i1 i2 (dy  dt)  dHi i G[ ]ip1 ip1q  q q  qi1 i2 i1 i2
dHp
N 1 (q  q )i1 i2
1 
ip1 q  qi1 i2
N qi1 (dy  dt)i i
ip1 q  qi1 i2
p  k dH , (9)N GN 1 (q  q )i1 i2
1 
ip1 q  qi1 i2
where
NA 1 (q  q )N i1 i2
k { , A { ,N N1 A q  qip1N i1 i2
and kN represents the degree of crowd-out. As the degree ofN r ,
crowd-out depends on limiting properties of the series AN, which appears
in both the numerator and denominator of kN.
Proposition 1. In an impurely altruistic model of private contribu-
tions to a pure public good, as the crowd-out of private contri-N r ,
butions in response to changes in government funding is asymptotically
(i) zero if AN converges to zero; (ii) dollar-for-dollar, or “complete,” if
AN is infinite in the limit; or (iii) between zero and dollar-for-dollar, or
“incomplete,” if AN converges to any nonzero finite number.
The series AN converges or diverges according to whether and how
fast This in turn depends on the functional form of theq  q r 1.i1 i2
underlying preference specification. To examine the properties of the
model more carefully, consider a version of the model in which donors
have identical preferences and disposable incomes so that q(7, 7)pi
for all i and 6q(7, 7) A p N[1 (q  q )]/(q  q ).N 1 2 1 2
It will also be convenient to refer to the rate at which asq  q r 11 2
the minimum number f for which flim (q  q  1)/N p a, 0 !Nr 1 2
In a minor deviation from standard notation, we write this asFaF ! .
Thus, if faster than rate N, Iffq  q  1p O(N ). q  q r 1 f ! 1.1 2 1 2
at exactly rate N, If slower than rate N,q  q r 1 fp 1. q  q r 11 2 1 2
; note that the case in which converges to a number otherf 1 1 q  q1 2
than one is included in this range ( ). When we shall sayfp 0 f 1 1,
that altruism remains “effective” at the margin. With this notation, the
representative donor version of proposition 1 is as follows.
6 Extending the model to incorporate donors with heterogeneous preferences and in-
comes is straightforward and does not change the main results.
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Corollary 1.1. If donors have identical preferences and disposable
incomes, then crowd-out is asymptotically (i) zero if (ii) com-f ! 1,
plete if or (iii) incomplete iff 1 1, fp 1.
Proposition 1 and corollary 1.1 are stated in terms of changes in
government funding without corresponding changes in the govern-
ment’s tax revenues. To examine a change in the government’s provision
of the public good that is financed by additional lump-sum taxes on
the donors and for comparability with previous analyses, corollary 1.2
considers a balanced-budget change in government funding.
Corollary 1.2. If donors have identical preferences and disposable
incomes and where dt is the representative donor’sdH p  dt p Ndt,G i
lump-sum tax change, then the balanced-budget asymptotic crowd-out
(i) equals if (ii) is complete if or (iii) is lim q f ! 1, f 1 1,Nr 1
incomplete but of magnitude where(A lim q )/(1 A),Nr 1
iflim A p A, fp 1.Nr N
The empirical implications of this result differ from those of corollary
1.1 only in that tax-induced income effects lead to some crowd-out in
case i. Corollaries 1.1 and 1.2 both imply that in an economy with a
large number of donors, a test for effective altruistic motives at the
margin amounts to a test for complete crowd-out. This is unlike models
with few donors in which appropriate tests for altruism must be based
on both crowd-out and income effects.7
The intuition behind case i in proposition 1 and the corollaries is
straightforward: if in the limit each donor behaves like a pure joy-of-
giver, there is no crowd-out beyond what might be caused by tax-induced
income effects.8 In contrast, it is somewhat surprising that in case ii
crowd-out is asymptotically complete even though each donor’s altruism
is impurely mixed with a joy-of-giving motive. The intuition is similar
to that offered by Andreoni (1989) to explain incomplete crowd-out
when a single impure altruist is taxed one dollar so that the government
can fund a one dollar increase in the public good. Because the public
provision is not a perfect substitute for her own gift, the impure altruist
does not completely neutralize the additional dollar provided by the
government. Thus the net effect of the government’s action is a fraction
of a dollar increase in the public good. A second impure altruist would
regard this fraction of a dollar as an exogenous increase in the public
good and neutralize another fraction of the increase. In the limit, as
each additional impure altruist neutralizes a fraction of the net change
7 Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1997) estimated models of altruism within the family
in which crowd-out was not dollar-for-dollar because of the income effect induced by the
change in social income.
8 A special case of this result for fixed coefficient–shaped preferences can be generated
by extending Mulligan’s (1997, pp. 314–16) analysis to ask what happens to crowd-out as
N increases.
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left by the others, the government’s initial attempt to increase the public
good is entirely neutralized.9 Case iii shows that asymptotically incom-
plete crowd-out is a knife-edge case. It can occur only when q  q r1 2
exactly at rate N.1
B. Sufficient Conditions for Asymptotically Zero Crowd-Out
In this subsection, we characterize a class of utility functions that lead
to asymptotically zero crowd-out. We assume that is concave,˜U(c , H, h )i i
is twice continuously differentiable, and has strictly positive first deriv-
atives, and for None of these assumptions isU (c , h , h ) !  h 1 0.H i i i i
particularly strong. Also, we assume that, for all levels of the public good
Ucc, Uhc, and Uhh are finite and is bounded away from˜H, U  2U  Ucc hc hh
zero. This implies that the second partial derivatives with respect to the
private goods in the model neither vanish nor diverge as the amount
of the public good increases. These, too, are fairly weak assumptions
because even though increases in the public good provided by others
increase an individual’s social income, they do not relax the private
income constraint on ci and hi. More important is the following defi-
nition, which describes a donor who would make a contribution re-
gardless of her marginal utility of the public good.
Definition. If we say that the joy-˜ ˜U (x , H, 0) U(x , H, 0) ≥ D 1 0,h i c i
of-giving motive is strictly operative at ˜H.
This definition, which requires that the utility gain via the joy of giving
from the first dollar contributed not vanish, is slightly stronger than the
usual notion of an operative motive that would permit a positive but
vanishing utility gain. The definition is not unreasonable; it simply for-
malizes the idea of a finite, private gain from giving that is independent
of the level of the public good.
We then have the following proposition (see App. A).
Proposition 2. If donors have identical preferences and disposable
9 Similar asymptotic arguments can be applied to results from other papers. For example,
Andreoni (1989) considered a balanced-budget change in government funding in which
only one person pays the necessary lump-sum tax. The change in total (public plus private)
provision of the public good is unaffected by this tax increase in the limit as (seeN r 
his eq. 6) unless the donors are all pure joy-of-givers. In this model and ours, a finite
change in public provision can be financed with asymptotically small increases in taxes
on each individual collected from a growing pool of individuals. In contrast, Andreoni
(1990) considered a change in public provision that implicitly grows with the number of
donors. Rearranging the equation for the change in total provision of the public good
in his proposition 3a, one can show that the change in private provision equals a weighted
average of the changes in individuals’ taxes minus the change in public provision. As the
change in public provision grows with the number of donors, the weighted average term
becomes relatively negligible. Thus, in the limit, the change in private provision equals
the negative of the change in public provision.
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incomes, preferences follow the assumptions above, and the joy-of-giving
motive is strictly operative, then crowd-out is asymptotically zero.
The essence of this result is that if very large amounts of the public
good are being provided and utility is concave, additional increases in
government support have negligible effects on individuals’ first-order
conditions and, consequently, on their optimal gifts. In a large economy,
a strictly operative joy-of-giving motive guarantees a large amount of the
public good because total provision grows with the number of donors.
This result is interesting because it explains the seemingly contradic-
tory evidence on crowd-out from the experimental and econometric
analyses. For the experimental studies in which N is typically very small,
the model predicts a relatively large degree of crowd-out unless indi-
viduals are characterized by nearly pure joy-of-giving preferences. In
contrast, the econometric studies examine gifts made to organizations
and activities that draw support from large bases of donors. Our as-
ymptotic results are consistent with these studies’ findings of small to
negligible crowd-out.10
To illustrate the theoretical results, consider a Cobb-Douglas utility
function
˜Up (1 h  h ) ln (c ) h ln (H) h ln (h ). (10a)1 2 i 1 2 i
This specification satisfies our initial assumptions and has a strictly op-
erative joy-of-giving motive ( when ). Solving for andU p  h p 0 qh i i1
yieldsqi2
∗ ∗˜ ˜H H
q  q p i1 i2
Z (H H )i i G
∗ 2 ∗ 2[(1 h  h )/(c ) ] [h /(h ) ]1 2 i 2 i
p . (11a)∗ 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 2˜[(1 h  h )/(c ) ] [h /(H ) ] [h /(h ) ]1 2 i 1 2 i
Hence, because and crowd-out will be2 ∗ ∗˜q  q  1p O(N ) H p Nhi1 i2 i
asymptotically zero.
10 There is a well-known literature that focuses on free riding with an experimentally
induced public good that increases subjects’ payoffs. A striking result from this litera-
ture—that there can be less free riding when the number of subjects is larger (see, e.g.,
Isaac, Walker, and Williams 1994)—can be explained via income effects in an impure
altruism model. However, because crowd-out is not explicitly studied in these experiments,
it is not clear what can be inferred about crowd-out from these results. For instance, it is
easy to construct examples of preferences that produce free-riding results qualitatively
similar to those of the experiments, but also with very unusual crowd-out predictions (i.e.,
large crowd-in).
Although we have focused on the conditions under which increases in the donor base
lead to large our crowd-out results would also hold if became large because of a˜ ˜H, H
sizable increase in government expenditures. Thus the model potentially reconciles the
historical evidence with contemporary econometric findings.
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Now modify the utility function so that and hi are perfect substitutes:˜H
˜Up (1 h) ln (c ) h ln (H h ), (10b)i i
which leads to
h 1 h
q p , q p . (11b)i1 i22 h 2 h
Obviously, in the limit, and crowd-out is asymp-1q  q r (2 h) ! 1i1 i2
totically complete.
A natural question is, How large does N have to be before the as-
ymptotic results become relevant for practical purposes? As an illustra-
tion, consider balanced-budget crowd-out as a function of N using the
preferences in (10a) and a relatively strong altruistic component to
giving ( and ). Crowd-out drops quickly as N in-h p 0.09 h p 0.011 2
creases: it is 70, 37, 15, and 9 percent for 10, 50, and 100 donors,Np 1,
respectively. While the calculations are clearly sensitive to the assump-
tions regarding functional form and the levels of income and govern-
ment expenditure, they suggest that the asymptotic results can become
relevant even when the number of donors is fairly small.
C. Other Extensions
To introduce features of the model that we shall examine in the econ-
ometric analysis, we consider several extensions of the representative
donor model. The most important is that we now assume that the im-
purely altruistic donor cares about the services provided by several char-
itable organizations to representative beneficiaries. For ease of exposi-
tion, consider two services, Q and R, provided by two charitable
institutions, H and K. Accordingly, preferences can be written U(ci, Q,
R, hi, ki), where hi and ki are nonnegative contributions to the two in-
stitutions. The budget constraint can be similarly modified: c  h i i
Donations hi and ki combine with the gifts of others, Hik p y  t.i i i
and Ki, and funding from the government, HG and KG, to form total
contributions to the institutions, and˜ ˜H K.
We assume that organization H concentrates its service expenditures
on Q, whereas K divides its service expenditures between Q and R.
Specifically, the institutions use their total contributions to provide ser-
vices according to
˜ ˜ ˜Qp l H bl K, Rp (1 b)l K, (12)H K K
where lH and lK are efficiency parameters that indicate the amount of
program services generated for each dollar contributed, and b is the
share of program expenditures K devotes to service Q. If therebp 0,
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is no overlap in the provision of services; if the organizationsbp 1,
offer exactly the same services.
The budget constraint can be rewritten by adding andH Hi G
to both sides of the equation and solving (12) to substituteK  Ki G
for :˜ ˜H K
˜ ˜c H Kp c  P Q p Rp Z ,i i H R i
Z { y  t H H  K  K , (13)i i i i G i G
where and The recipro-P p 1/l , P p 1/l , p p (P  bP )/(1 b).H H K K R K H
cals of the l terms, PH and PK, can be thought of as “efficiency prices.”
Because H provides only the service Q, the price of delivering one unit
of Q is simply PH. The price of a unit of R, pR, is a function of both
prices and the degree of program overlap.
Repeating the type of analysis that led to (9) yields a demand for
service Q, PH, PK, b), which leads to the
∗Q p q(Z , H H , K  K ,i i G i G
following comparative static equation for donations to H:
1dHp [N P (q  q )(N 1)] P q (dy  dt)H 1 2 H 1 i i{
 [1 P (q  q )]NdH  P (q  q )dKH 1 2 G H 1 3
˜P HH
˜ b  P (q  q ) NdK  P q NdP( )H 1 3 H 4 H[ ]P PK H
b 1
˜ ˜ P q  K NdP  P q  K db . (14)H 5 K H 6( ) ( )2 }P PK K
A similar expression can be derived for dK.
In equation (14), as in equation (9), government funding generates
asymptotically zero or complete crowd-out depending on the functional
form of utility. There are two other straightforward comparative static
results to note. First, program expenditures of K crowd out contribu-
tions to H: the more similar K is to H (i.e., the closer b is to one), the
more its program expenditures crowd out contributions to H. Second,
each organization affects its own contributions and those to similar
organizations through its service mix and efficiency. An increase in
efficiency reduces the organization’s own giving price, raises the implicit
price of contributions to its “competitor,” and consequently increases
contributions.
Finally, to include a role for organizations’ fund-raising activities, the
model can be modified so that donors face fixed transaction costs in
making their contribution decisions. We then posit that solicitation ef-
forts lower these costs either by reducing a donor’s time spent in gath-
charitable behavior 437
ering information about a charity or by minimizing the time and ex-
pense required to actually send a donation.
III. Evidence from Previous Empirical Studies
Previous empirical analyses based on cross-section data have uniformly
found that government support does not completely crowd out private
donations, with most estimates of the crowd-out effect falling in the
range of zero to one-half. These studies have been criticized, however,
for several methodological problems that may have biased their esti-
mates away from findings of crowd-out.
Early studies relied on data gathered from tax returns or general
surveys. As Steinberg (1991) pointed out, these studies were not able
to precisely match specific types of private donations to related forms
of government support. This meant that government support was ef-
fectively mismeasured and that estimates of its effects were biased toward
zero. Kingma (1989) was the first to address the mismatch problem in
his study of private and public contributions to National Public Radio
stations. Subsequently, several other studies have adopted Kingma’s
methodology and examined private and public support on an organi-
zation-by-organization basis. These improvements notwithstanding,
Kingma’s research and the later studies continued to generate small
estimates of crowd-out.
Studies have also been criticized for not addressing potential biases
associated with relevant omitted variables (Andreoni 1993). Specifically,
there could be unmeasured factors such as the reputation of a particular
organization or a change in need among the set of potential benefici-
aries that drive both private contributions and government support.
Failure to account for these factors might lead to a spurious positive
correlation between measures of private and public support (i.e., away
from a finding of strong crowd-out). Recent studies by Khanna et al.
(1995), Joulfaian and Power (1996), Payne (1998), Khanna and Sandler
(2000), and Okten and Weisbrod (2000) have addressed the issue of
omitted institution-specific factors by examining panel data for organ-
izations and specifying their models to include organization fixed ef-
fects. In an effort to control for changes in need, Payne went a step
further and specified her model to also include separate, general time
effects for the regions served by each organization in her panel. Two
well-known limitations of the fixed-effects approach are that it does not
address biases from unmeasured factors that vary with individual or-
ganizations over time and that it may exacerbate biases associated with
other statistical problems such as measurement error and simultaneity.
Nevertheless, in the absence of direct measures of the relevant variables,
fixed effects may be the only controls available.
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A final methodological problem is that government support might
be an endogenous variable (Roberts 1993). In this case, bias would arise
if either the unobserved determinants of government support and pri-
vate contributions were correlated or private contributions were a direct
determinant of government support (e.g., through matching require-
ments). Depending on the source of correlation, fixed effects could be
used to address the first type of bias; however, they would not eliminate
the second type of bias. A more appropriate remedy for endogeneity is
to use an instrumental variables procedure. Payne (1998) and Khanna
and Sandler (2000) have taken this approach, but both studies relied
on questionable instruments.11 As a practical matter, it is hard to find
instruments that predict government support and are convincingly un-
related to private contributions except through government support.
IV. Analysis Data Set
The study examines contributions and expenditures from a 1986–92
panel of 125 international relief and development organizations. The
financial data come primarily from the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), which gathered the information as part of a
registration process (Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs, 1988–94). The
USAID registry reports the amounts of private donations and govern-
ment funding received by each organization in each year. The registry
also contains other useful data such as the amounts of private and public
in-kind support (e.g., freight, food), grants from private foundations,
and amounts spent on fund-raising and administration.
The roster of organizations in the USAID registry was relatively stable
across years; however, there were a few changes (mostly new registrations
of existing organizations). To reduce the amount of missing data, we
supplemented the USAID information by obtaining annual financial
statements directly from 28 organizations that registered after 1986. We
also obtained financial statements for another large organization, the
U.S. Committee for United Nations International Children’s Emergency
Fund (UNICEF), that never registered.12 After the registry and supple-
11 Payne examined contributions to domestic social service organizations and used trans-
fer payments to individuals and other organizations as instruments for government sup-
port. The difficulty with these instruments is that they might directly affect contributions
by reducing need among the organizations’ potential beneficiaries. Khanna and Sandler
examined charitable organizations in the United Kingdom and used as instruments annual
measures of the government’s total grant making and deficit spending. Their aggregate
measures might alter contributions through effects on recipients’ need or donors’ incomes.
12 U.S. support for UNICEF was provided each year as a separate line item in the Foreign
Assistance Act rather than through the USAID; the analysis includes this line item funding
as a source of public support. Where possible, the study also independently obtained
financial statements from the organizations in the USAID registry and verified the USAID
figures.
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mental data were input, we removed organizations that (i) were still
missing data in any year, (ii) reported zero contributions in any year,
or (iii) directed more than one-quarter of their program expenditures
toward the United States. In addition, we dropped observations for
another organization, the United Israel Appeal, after specification tests
indicated that it was an outlier. The first two screens eliminate some
small forming and declining organizations. The third screen orients the
data set toward contributions that are driven by altruism or joy of giving
rather than personal consumption or insurance motives; unfortunately,
it removes some large organizations that are commonly identified with
international relief including the American Red Cross, Church World
Service, Feed the Children, Habitat for Humanity, and Project Hope.
Despite these exclusions, the resulting data still provide a reasonably
complete description of U.S. giving to international relief and devel-
opment. The included organizations account for just over three-quarters
of the total annual public support and just over half of the private
contributions recorded by all organizations in the USAID registry. The
monetary portion of the private contributions is about two-thirds of the
amount of total overseas contributions computed independently by Kap-
lan (1993) from data from the Internal Revenue Service. Appendix table
B1 lists the 125 organizations in our data set along with their average
annual level of private contributions.
At first glance, 1986–92 might not look like a good period in which
to examine the effects of public overseas relief expenditures because
there was little variation over this span in the total levels of U.S. bilateral
development and food assistance. However, the trends in total assistance
levels mask important compositional shifts that are captured in the
study’s data set. Over this period, the United States increased the per-
centage of foreign aid that it channeled through private agencies.13
Accordingly, U.S. public monetary and in-kind support of organizations
in the analysis data set rose from just under $1 billion in 1987 to $1.4
billion in 1992. Funding for population planning and general health
programs fell dramatically, and assistance targeted toward child survival
and treatment and prevention of AIDS rose. There were also shifts in
geographic emphasis such as the commencement of the Development
Fund for Africa in fiscal year 1988. Democratization in the Philippines,
the end of the conflict in Central America, and the end of the Cold
War resulted in several other area-specific development initiatives. Fi-
nally, there were modest increases in funding received from other gov-
13 Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act for fiscal years 1982 and 1983 required
that at least 12 percent, and encouraged that at least 16 percent, of the funding for
agricultural development, health and population programs, education, energy develop-
ment, disaster assistance, and development assistance for sub-Saharan Africa be provided
through voluntary organizations. The requirement was raised to 13.5 percent in 1986.
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ernments and international institutions such as the World Bank, which
are included in the study’s measures of public support.
Besides the annual contributions and public support information, the
analysis data also include measures of fund-raising and administrative
expenses. The study combines these data with total expenditure data
to calculate efficiency prices in a manner that is now standard in em-
pirical studies (see, e.g., Khanna et al. 1995); specifically, the price is
defined as the reciprocal of the share of service expenditures (total
expenditures less fund-raising and administrative expenses) in total ex-
penditures. It should be noted that there is some dispute regarding
whether efficiency prices belong in the model.14 The study includes price
measures for comparability with previous studies; however, the crowd-
out estimates are not sensitive to their inclusion or omission.
Data from a separate set of USAID executive contact lists (U.S. Agency
for International Development 1988, 1991, 1992) were used to deter-
mine the activities in which the charities were engaged and the regions
of the world in which they operated. The contact lists identified 49
service activities and seven regions. These data provide the dimensions
by which the study defines the extent of program overlap across organ-
izations.15 Following the notation from the previous section, let de-Q j,t
note total expenditures by all organizations in year t on the specific mix
of services supported by organization j. The service mix can be thought
of as a unique activity, and expenditures to this activity can be written
as a weighted sum of expenditures by related organizations:
J
˜Q p w l H , (15)j,t j,k k,t k,t
kp1
where and for j, J (the weights represent the0 ≤ w ≤ 1 w p 1 kp 1,j,k j,j
share of k’s expenditures dedicated to j’s service mix). Related service
expenditures by organizations other than j can then be defined as
˜ ˜Q p Q  l H p w l H . (16)j,t j,t j,t j,t j,k k,t k,t
k(j
14 For instance, Steinberg (1986) has argued that a rational donor might view fund-
raising and administration as fixed costs, consider his or her full contribution as aug-
menting program services, and therefore not be influenced by expenditures on these
activities. Similarly, a donor who is entirely motivated by joy of giving would be indifferent
to the amount spent on fund-raising and administration. Altruists might actually benefit
from fund-raising if it increases the contributions of others and the marginal return to
fund-raising exceeds one. Beyond these conceptual issues, there is an empirical problem
that identification of the price effect rests on functional form assumptions regarding the
direct effects of fund-raising and administration.
15 We also gathered data on regions and activities from other sources (e.g., the organ-
izations’ annual reports). The other regional indicators are combined with those from
the executive contact list to create the regional dummies. The results are not sensitive to







Total private contributions* 13.203 27.449
Fund-raising expenditures* 1.093 3.257
Administrative expenditures* 1.558 2.737
Efficiency price 1.235 .399
Direct government support* 9.723 32.810
Activities of organizations:
Preventative health .672 .470
Other medical assistance .464 .499
Agricultural assistance .072 .259
Rural development .424 .495
Small enterprise development .400 .490
Other development activities .672 .470
Education .680 .467
Emergency assistance .536 .499
Political assistance .240 .427
Family planning .264 .441




Eastern Europe .456 .498
Central and South America .776 .417
Israel .176 .381
Near East (other than Israel) .264 .441
Significant activity in United States .152 .359
Note.—There are 750 annual organization observations (125 organizations).
* Amount in millions of constant 1992 dollars.
The study’s data set contains the total service expenditures for each
organization, but not the expenditure shares, wj,k. Consequently,˜l H ,j,t j,t
the study approximates using the ratio of the number of servicesQj,t
common to j and k and the total number of services offered by k as an
approximation for wj,k and letting The empiricalˆ ˜ˆQ p  w l H .k(jj,t j,k k,t k,t
analysis considers alternative specifications of based (i) on the ac-ˆQj,t
tivity categories alone and (ii) more narrowly on the intersection of
activities and regions.
The data on regions and activities are also employed as independent
controls in the empirical analysis. Because of concerns regarding mul-
ticollinearity, the 49 activity categories used to form are collapsedˆQj,t
to a smaller set of 11 activities. Reasonable assumptions and a series of
exploratory factor analyses guided the selection of condensed catego-
ries. The regions and collapsed set of 11 activity categories are listed in
table 1.
The study also uses data from the executive contact lists and the
Encyclopedia of Associations (Gale Research Co., 1985–90) to identify
changes in the leadership of the organizations. The organizations in
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the data set experienced 147 changes in leadership (just over one per
organization).
Means and standard deviations for the private contributions and other
analysis variables are reported in table 1. All dollar amounts in the data
set are adjusted to 1992 levels using the implicit gross domestic product
deflator. Because the subsequent empirical analysis includes lagged re-
alizations of some variables, the effective length of the panel is reduced
from seven to six years (1987–92). As the figures in the table reveal, the
organizations in the data set are very large: the average annual level of
private contributions to each organization is $13 million. The figures
also indicate that the organizations receive a great deal of government
funding, nearly $10 million per organization per year.
V. Econometric Analysis
The study estimates regressions of the determinants of private contri-
butions to organization j in year t. Each of the regressions is specified
as
′ˆH p g H  g Q  X G e , (17)j,t G G,j,t Q j,t jt j,t
where denotes direct government support, denotes relatedˆH QG,j,t j,t
service expenditures by other organizations, is a vector of otherX j,t
observed time-varying determinants (the organization’s own efficiency
price, its current and lagged fund-raising expenditures, and the current
effective price of related charitable activities), and ej,t is an unobserved
organization- and year-specific error term. The parameters to be esti-
mated are the coefficients on government support and other organi-
zations’ spending, gG and gQ, and the general vector of coefficients, G.
Because of the enormous variation in the sizes of the organizations,
heteroskedasticity is likely to be a problem. Accordingly, the coefficient
standard errors for all the regressions are computed using White’s
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method.
The principal regression results are reported in table 2. From left to
right, the specifications in table 2 include additional sets of dummy
variable controls to reduce possible biases associated with different types
of omitted variables. Column a lists estimates from a regression that
includes dummy variables for each year. The year dummies account for
period-specific factors such as domestic changes in economic conditions,
tax laws, and expenditure policies and global changes in need that might
affect donors to all organizations. The regression in column b adds
dummy variables for each organization. These dummies control for
organization-specific characteristics such as program mix, managerial
ability, religious orientation, and institution ideology that might affect
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Year effects (5) yes yes yes yes yes
Organization effects (124) no yes yes yes yes
Activity#year effects (55) no no yes yes yes
Geographic area#year ef-
fects (35) no no no yes yes
Organization leadership ef-
fects (147) no no no no yes
2R .685 .972 .976 .977 .984
Note.—All results are based on 750 observations (six years of data for 125 organizations). The dependent variable
and right-hand-side funding/expenditure variables are expressed in millions of constant 1992 dollars. All specifications
are estimated using ordinary least squares. The estimated expenditure shares for are defined in terms of organi-ˆQj,t
zations’ activities. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) appear in parentheses.
** Significant at the .05 level.
*** Significant at the .01 level.
the pool of donors (see Rose-Ackerman 1982, 1986); these effects may
also control for correlation in the unobserved determinants of contri-
butions across organizations (Case 1991).
The regressions in the next two columns add interacted controls.
Specification c adds interactions of the activity dummies from table 1
with the full set of year dummies; specification d includes interactions
of the regional dummies with the year dummies. The activity#year and
geographic area#year variables pick up changes in particular groups’
needs for assistance, the emergence of new targeted government ini-
tiatives and other shifts in program emphasis by the USAID, and unob-
served contributions from outside the United States to the same activities
and regions.
The regression in column e of table 2 replaces the fixed organization
dummies with a more comprehensive set of dummy variables that are
specific to administrations (changes in the president or chief executive
officer) within each organization. Changes in administration might co-
incide with the initiation of fund-raising campaigns, changes in program
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emphasis, and other activities that jointly affect contributions, govern-
ment support, and the other explanatory variables.
Specification tests indicate that the year, organization, and activ-
ity#year dummy variables are all jointly significant and that specifica-
tions a and b can be rejected. However, once these other controls are
included, adding the geographic area#year and leadership change var-
iables does not significantly increase the model’s explanatory power.
Although we are not completely justified on statistical grounds, we prefer
to base our examination of complete crowd-out on model e because it
utilizes the most extensive set of controls for unobserved heterogeneity
and generates the largest crowd-out point estimates. For brevity, the
bulk of our discussion focuses on the estimation results from this model.
The coefficient estimates for government spending and service ex-
penditures from specification e strongly reject hypotheses of complete
crowd-out and thus indicate that donors’ preferences are not guided at
the margin by altruism. The point estimates for both coefficients are
small and statistically different from 1. Lower bounds for 95 percent
confidence intervals around and are consistent with crowd-out ofˆ ˆg gG Q
at most 23 cents per dollar of government spending and 8 cents per
dollar of other organizations’ spending. When we compare results across
specifications, the coefficients on government and other organizations’
spending are moderately sensitive to the inclusion of additional sets of
controls, with specification e yielding the strongest crowd-out results.
While this lends some credence to the statistical criticisms of previous
econometric work, the literature’s chief finding of small crowd-out ef-
fects is nevertheless upheld.
Among the other results from specification e, the coefficients on con-
temporaneous and lagged fund-raising expenditures are significantly
positive. The estimates indicate that these expenditures are cost-effec-
tive, on average returning over $8 in contributions (over two years) for
each dollar spent. The coefficient on PH is significantly positive, a result
that runs counter to the interpretation of this variable as a price mea-
sure. The coefficient on the cross-price term is also significantly positive.
When we look across regressions, the results for the price and fund-
raising variables are sensitive to the inclusion of the organization effects;
the price variables are also sensitive to the inclusion of the leadership
change effects.
Additional sensitivity analyses.—Table 3 lists results from respecifications
of model e that replace the contemporaneous measures of government
support, other organizations’ expenditures, and prices with one-year
lags of these variables (specification f); use a narrower description of
program overlap based on both activity and region (specification g);
and combine the narrower overlap description with one-year lags (spec-
ification h). The respecified models are estimated to check the robust-
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Regression Analysis of Private Contributions to International Relief and
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Expenditure shares for de-ˆQj,t







2R .983 .984 .983
Note.—All results are based on 750 observations (six years of data for 125 organizations). Dependent and right-
hand-side funding/expenditure variables are expressed in millions of constant 1992 dollars. All specifications are es-
timated using ordinary least squares and include year, organization, activity#year, geographic area#year, and organi-
zation leadership fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980) appear in parentheses.
** Significant at the .05 level.
*** Significant at the .01 level.
ness of our results to several potential concerns. First, there is a possi-
bility of bias if the explanatory variables in the previous models are
contemporaneously correlated with the unobserved determinants of
contributions, that is, if some residual correlation exists after the dif-
ferent fixed-effect controls are applied. The use of lagged variables
might eliminate this problem. Second, the lagged measures may provide
better descriptions than the contemporaneous measures of the infor-
mation available to donors when they make their contribution decisions.
Third, the interaction of activities and regions may also better describe
donors’ views of the overlap between organizations.
The results from table 3 again reject the hypothesis of complete crowd-
out. For model f, the coefficient on spending by other organizations
remains small but statistically significant, whereas the coefficient on
government spending changes sign and loses its significance. The co-
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efficients on the lagged price variables are also small and insignificant.
Specification g, which uses contemporaneous measures but a narrower
definition of program overlap, generates crowd-out estimates that are
nearly identical to those from table 2. When lags are introduced in
specification h, the evidence regarding crowd-out again becomes weaker.
Other respecifications of model e have been estimated to check the
sensitivity of the crowd-out results to the inclusion of the price and fund-
raising variables and the omission of controls for administrative expen-
ditures. The estimates indicate that the study’s findings are robust to
these other specification issues. For brevity, detailed results from these
regressions are not reported.16
While the robustness of the estimation results to the inclusion of so
many different types of controls increases our confidence regarding our
rejection of complete crowd-out, the sensitivity analyses are not defin-
itive. Instrumental variable methods might have provided more con-
vincing estimates of the effect of government support on private con-
tributions; unfortunately, we could not locate any theoretically justified
instruments that were reliable predictors of government spending.17
Because the regressions from tables 2 and 3 do not control for every
possible common factor influencing private and government support,
we must consider whether the remaining unobserved sources of co-
variation are large enough to overturn our findings.
Beyond the determinants specified in our theoretical model, we have
already conjectured that the main additional influences on private and
government support are changes in the needs of recipients (such as
those caused by epidemics, natural disasters, and war) and in the focus
and reputation of an organization’s officers, staff, and operations. The
activity and area effects interacted with year dummies in our models
capture some, but not all, of the changes in need. To illustrate, consider
responses to a health crisis such as the AIDS epidemic. If the crisis
occurs throughout the world, then the medical assistance activity#year
effect controls for the common effect of the crisis on private and gov-
ernment support. The activity#year controls are also efficacious if the
crisis is localized (e.g., in Africa) and private donors and the government
respond simply to the type, rather than location, of the crisis. If these
conditions are not met, then additional controls might be needed for
the separate effects of crises within regions.
Similarly, the administration-specific dummies control for changes in
each organization’s reputation, direction, and leadership when there is
a change in top executives. However, the dummies fail to control for
16 The results are available from the authors in an unpublished appendix.
17 Besides addressing biases from omitted variables, instrumental variables methods
would also address possible biases associated with the simultaneous determination of pri-
vate and government support.
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changes in these characteristics over the course of an administration.
For example, within an administration there may be surges in grant
writing and development efforts that lead to simultaneous bursts in
public and private support.
It is important to realize, however, that there are numerous sources
of independent variation in the government support variable. For in-
stance, government support may be influenced by the strategic and
political importance of countries in which aid is directed, by domestic
political considerations favoring specific activities or organizations, and
by the availability of excess supplies and services (supplemental food,
ocean freight, etc.). Also, compared to private donors, the government
may be more or less willing to fund long-term projects, riskier projects,
and innovative projects. An adverse side effect of our dummy controls
for time, activity, area, and leadership effects is that they absorb some
of this independent variation along with the confounding variation from
omitted variables.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the list of controls is not ex-
haustive, and the resulting estimates may still be biased. Nevertheless,
the controls are quite extensive and go far beyond what previous studies
have been able to include. In the end, the interpretation of the estimates
comes down to a judgment about the balance of the independent and
confounding sources of variation in the government support measure
after the controls have been applied.
An alternative interpretation of the rejection of complete crowd-out
is that although donors’ altruism is effective at the margin, their lack
of knowledge about government funding of international relief organ-
izations offsets the larger crowd-out that would otherwise appear in the
data. Although the ability of our data to examine this possibility is lim-
ited, we did construct a proxy for donor uncertainty over government
funding for each organization in a given year by using the variance of
funding over the previous three years. Including this proxy as a regressor
in several respecifications of model e led to only minor changes in the
crowd-out estimates. In addition, rudimentary calculations indicate that
a very large amount of uncertainty is necessary to make complete crowd-
out deceptively look like zero crowd-out. It is not known whether the
degree of uncertainty that actually exists is this large; if it is, however,
other calculations indicate that donors would be willing to pay very
large amounts to have such uncertainty eliminated.18 Again, although
18 For simplicity, these calculations are based on donor preferences that are purely
altruistic with a minimum demand for own consumption :(z )min
Up (1 h) ln (y  h  t  z ) h ln (h H );i i i min i G
thus a threshold level of own consumption is first met before donations are made. When
these preferences are parameterized with an altruism coefficient and minimalhp 0.10
consumption an income yi of $50,000 leads to an optimal contributionz p 40,000,min
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there are no data on the actual amounts donors would have to pay to
remove this uncertainty, it seems unlikely that these costs are prohibitive
because information on government support can be obtained directly
from the charity with little monetary or time expense once donors have
received a mail solicitation.
Turning attention toward the evidence for zero crowd-out, we find it
to be somewhat mixed but on balance consistent with joy-of-giving mo-
tives. Government crowd-out is significantly different from zero only in
specification e, but this specification can be rejected in favor of c. While
crowd-out from other charities’ expenditures is significant in specifi-
cation c, it is so small that it could easily be explained by other phe-
nomena, such as the presence of some inframarginal changes in the
expenditure data. Likewise, the small changes in both crowd-out esti-
mates when the activity#year effects are added suggest a minor role of
needs.
VI. Conclusion
This paper conducts a theoretical and empirical investigation of the
altruistic and joy-of-giving motivations underlying contributions to char-
itable activities. Our theoretical analysis examines the asymptotic crowd-
out properties of an impurely altruistic model of giving. Previous the-
oretical studies of this model have found that changes in government
support for a charitable activity incompletely crowd out private contri-
butions. In contrast, our analysis shows that in an economy with an
infinitely large number of donors, impurely altruistic preferences lead
to either asymptotically zero or asymptotically complete crowd-out. As-
ymptotically zero crowd-out occurs when joy-of-giving motives remain
effective among the population but large expenditures on the charitable
activity depress the marginal utility associated with altruism. If, however,
altruistic motives remain marginally effective, crowd-out is asymptotically
complete. Because there are many standard utility functions that satisfy
the former condition, asymptotically zero crowd-out appears to be a
likely outcome. The difference in the model’s small and large sample
predictions offers a potential reconciliation of differences in previous
experimental and econometric findings.
(2 percent of income) when Under donor certainty, a change in∗h p $1,000 H p 0.i G
the government contribution to financed by an equivalent lump-sum tax wouldH p $100G
crowd out $100 of the private contribution. If, instead, the donor considers HG to be a
random variable with an accompanying standard deviation of greater thanE[H ]p $100,G
three times this amount ($369) is necessary to produce zero crowd-out (the optimal hi
under uncertainty is calculated using a second-order Taylor expansion of ).1E[(h H ) ]i G
Moreover, because donor utility is lower under uncertainty, the donor in this example
would be willing to pay up to $71 to have the uncertainty removed. This is a large amount
relative to the change in the government’s contribution from zero to $100.
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For our empirical analysis we assemble a 1986–92 panel of contri-
bution and expenditure data for 125 international relief and develop-
ment organizations. The data are new and permit us to interpret crowd-
out estimates as tests for altruism. The estimation methodology—which
controls for unobserved institution-specific factors, year-to-year changes
in need, changes in organization leadership, and interorganization
crowd-out between institutions that provide similar services and operate
in the same regions of the world—addresses several statistical problems
that potentially affected previous empirical studies of crowd-out. The
model generates estimates of both government and interorganization
crowd-out that are very small. The findings of small crowd-out effects
are robust to alternative definitions of the degree of similarity across
organizations and the use of lagged measures of government funding
and related organizations’ service expenditures. While there are some
qualifications concerning data representativeness and the potentially
confounding role of donor uncertainty, we argue that these problems
are likely to have only minor consequences. More important, a potential
bias remains in the results because of the endogeneity of government
support. The amount of unobserved common variation between gov-
ernment support and private donations—relative to the amount of in-
dependent variation in government support—that survives the array of
fixed effects we use determines the size of the bias.
Although these qualifications must be kept in mind during any in-
terpretation of the empirical findings, the results as they stand suggest
that altruistic motivations behind contributions to international relief
and development are extremely weak at the margin. This interpretation
is compatible with the theoretical finding that even a small amount of
marginally effective altruism would have led to asymptotically complete
crowd-out. This interpretation does not necessarily imply that altruistic
concern is absent from the donors’ utility functions, only that it is not
effective for the size of the population and level of contributions we
observe. While the theoretical analysis demonstrates that the impurely
altruistic model reconciles these results with previous experimental ev-
idence, the empirical analysis does not directly test this proposition. In
future research, we hope to consider the relationship between the num-
ber of donors and crowd-out using both experimental and secondary
data.
Likewise, the empirical analysis suggests that modest changes in U.S.
development assistance do not lead to comparably sized adjustments in
private contributions to international poverty relief. At the same time,
however, the theoretical analysis shows that it is not possible to extrap-
olate beyond this interpretation to consider larger changes in govern-
ment support. If one accepts the conjecture that the preferences mo-
tivating these contributions are similar to those underlying domestic
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poverty relief, parallel conclusions could be drawn concerning the re-
lationship between changes in public welfare spending and private as-
sistance to the domestic poor.
Appendix A
Proofs of Theoretical Results
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) If then (ii) If thenlim A p 0, lim k p 0. lim A p , lim k pNr N Nr N Nr N Nr N
(iii) If then where A is finite.1. lim A p A 1 0, lim k pA/(1A),Nr N Nr N
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1.1
If then Thus (i) impliesf f1q  q  1p O(N ), A p O(N ). f !1 f 1 ! 01 2 N
and (ii) implies and and (iii)lim A p 0, f 11 f 1 1 0 lim A p ,Nr N Nr N
implies and Q.E.D.fp1 f 1p 0 lim A p A 1 0.Nr N
Proof of Corollary 1.2
In the representative donor model (when )dy p 0i
q 1 (q  q )1 1 2
 NdtN dHGq  q q  q1 2 1 2dHp , (A1)
1 (q  q )1 21N
q  q1 2
where can be factored out. The income effect due to taxes is thenNdtp dHG
The limit of this term is in case i, is zero in1q (q  q ) /(1A ).  lim q1 1 2 N Nr 1
case ii, and is in case iii. The respective necessary modifi-( lim q )/(1A)Nr 1
cations to the crowd-out effects immediately follow. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Assumption 1. For all levels of the public good Ucc, Uhc, and Uhh are finite˜H,
and is bounded away from zero.U  2U Ucc hc hh
Lemma 1. Under assumption 1, if UHH, UHh, and UHc converge to zero, then
converges to zero. Also, its rate of convergence is the same as forq  q  11 2
U U U .HH Hh Hc
Proof. Take the differentials of the first-order condition (5) with respect to Zi
and and then solve for and in terms of the∗ ∗˜ ˜H H H /Z H /(H H )i G i i G
second partials of U. Recall from (6) that these expressions are q1 and q2, re-
spectively. Adding them together yields
1U U UHH Hh Hcq  q p 1 . (A2)1 2 ( )U  2U U U Ucc hc hh Hh Hc
Under assumption 1, the lemma follows immediately. Because we shall subse-
quently show that both UHh and UHc converge to zero, the technical problem of
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evaluating the limit when is avoided by the as-U  2U U p(U U )cc hc hh Hh Hc
sumption that is bounded away from zero. Q.E.D.U  2U Ucc hc hh
Assumption 2a. is (i) concave and (ii) twice continuously˜U(c , H, h )i i
differentiable.
Assumption 2b. (i) (ii) and (iii) for all (nonsatiation).˜U 1 0, U 1 0, U 1 0 HH c h
Assumption 2c. forU (c , h , h ) !  h 1 0.H i i i i
Lemma 2. If the joy-of-giving motive is strictly operative for all levels of the
public good and utility is nonsatiable in the public good and continuously dif-
ferentiable, then is bounded away from zero as∗h (N ) N r .i
Proof. We wish to establish that by assuming that∗lim h (N ) ≥ h 1 0Nr i
and then showing that this contradicts continuity of the utility∗lim h (N )p 0Nr i
function’s first derivatives. Without loss of generality, the proof neglects the
government provision HG.
First, note that, given solves∗H (N ), h (N )i i
∗ ∗ ∗U (x  h (N ),H (N ) h (N ),h (N ))U (7, 7 ,7)p U(7, 7 ,7), (A3)h i i i i i H c
which, under the assumption that impliesU 1 0,H
∗ ∗ ∗U (x  h (N ), H (N ) h (N ), h (N )) ! U(7, 7 , 7). (A4)h i i i i i c
Define as the contribution that would equateJh (N ) U (7, 7 , 7)p U(7, 7 , 7).i h c
Clearly, An operative joy-of-giving motive (strictly operative is notJ ∗h (N ) ! h (N ).i i
necessary at this point) implies Jh (N ) 1 0.i
Now assume Because this must imply∗ J ∗lim h (N )p 0. 0 ! h (N ) ! h (N ),Nr i i i
However, this violates the continuity of Uh and Uc. To see this,
Jlim h (N )p 0.Nr i
define a function
f(h (N )){ U (x  h (N ),H (N ) h (N ),h (N ))U(7, 7 ,7);i h i i i i i c
hence, is continuous. By construction, Thus the continuity ofJf(7) f(h (N ))p 0.i
requires that But if the joy of giving is strictly operativeJf(7) lim f(h (N ))p 0.Jh (N )r0 ii
at all H, then regardless of whether is converging or diverging, we mustH (N )i
have This establishes the contradiction. Q.E.D.f(0) ≥ D 1 0.
Remarks for lemma 2.—The more formal continuity argument follows. Recall
that is continuous at zero if, for every there is a such that, for allf(7) e 1 0, d 1 0
satisfying Now pick For allJ J Jh (N ) Fh (N ) 0F ! d, Ff(h (N )) f(0)F ! e. ep D/2.i i i
and all satisfying we haveJ J Jd 1 0 h (N ) Fh (N ) 0F ! d, Ff(h (N )) f(0)Fp D 1i i i
ep D/2.
Lemma 2 can be proved under slightly weaker conditions. The joy-of-giving
motive need be strictly operative only over a range of where isH [H, ), H
the amount of the public good that would be provided in the absence of any
joy-of-giving motive (Andreoni [1988] has proved that is finite). Adding in aH
joy-of-giving motive must yield aggregate contributions H ≥ H.
Lemma 3. If the joy-of-giving motive is strictly operative for all levels of the
public good and utility is described by assumption 2, then (i) UHH, UHh, and UHc
converge to zero; (ii) the convergence rate of is the one atU U UHH Hh Hc
which ; and (iii) the convergence rate is faster than 1U r 0 O(N ).HH
Proof. The idea of the proof is to note that in the representative donor model
the result of lemma 2, implies that Then∗ ∗lim h (N ) ≥ h 1 0, lim H (N )p .Nr i Nr
concavity establishes parts i and ii of the lemma. First write
H
U (x  h ,H,h )U (x  h ,h ,h )p U (x  h ,w,h )dw. (A5)H i i i H i i i i  HH i i i
hi
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The left-hand side is a finite negative number. This can be seen by noting that
part i of assumption 2b and concavity imply U (x  h , h , h ) ≥ U (x  h ,H i i i i H i i
for all and that is finite (assumption 2c).H, h ) 1 0 H ≥ h U (x  h , h , h )i i H i i i i
Hence, the integral must be finite as Because con- U (x  h , w, h )dw H r .∫h H i i ii
cavity requires for all H, this integral can converge only ifU (7, H, 7) ≤ 0HH
We can state this result as where is theflim U p 0. U p O(N ), f ! 0Hr HH HH
convergence rate of UHH.
Concavity also requires positive second principle minors; in particular,
The first term is positive and in the limit converges to zero2U U  (U ) ≥ 0.cc HH Hc
because UHH is converging to zero and Ucc is finite (if Ucc was , then Uc would
become negative in violation of part ii of assumption 2b). Hence, to satisfy this
second principle minor condition in the limit, UHc must converge to zero and
at a rate faster than UHH. That is, where A similar ar-
xU p O(N ), x ≤ f ! 0.Hc
gument establishes where Together these results pro-wU p O(N ), w ≤ f ! 0.Hh
duce Parts i and ii of the lemma are established.fU U U p O(N ).HH hh Hc
It remains to be shown that (faster than rate N convergence). We shallf !1
assume the opposite and show that this contradicts the previous result that the
integral in (A5) is finite. To begin, we write a lower bound for the (negative)
of that integral:
∗H (N )
∗ ∗U (x  h (N ), w, h (N ))dw HH i i i
∗h (N )i
N
∗ ∗ ∗≥ U (7, H (k), 7)[H (k)H (k 1)] HH
kp1
N
∗≥ h(N ) U (7, H (k), 7), (A6) HH
kp1
where which is finite and bounded away from∗ ∗h(N ){min [H (k)H (k 1)],k
zero in the limit (lemma 2).
Consider the sequence and the series where we haveU (k)  U (k),HH HH
suppressed explicit reference to We know that where∗ fH (k). U (k)p O(k ),HH
but now assume Then there exists a number s,f ! 0, f ≥1. 1 ≤ s ≤ f ! 0,
such that the sequence ks converges to zero faster than but slower thanU (k)HH
; that is, Then by the limit comparison test, if1 sO(k ) lim [k/U (k)]p 0.kr HH
diverges, which it does in this case because then diverges.s k s ≥1,  U (k)HH
Then (A6) implies that the left-hand side integral diverges and the contradiction
is achieved. Q.E.D.








Adventist Development and Relief Agency Internat. 11.34
African Medical and Research Found. .76
African Methodist Episcopal Church Service and Development Agency .13
African-American Inst. 1.16
African-American Labor Center .24
Africare 5.37
AFS Intercultural Programs* 3.60
Aga Khan Found., USA 2.95
Agricultural Cooperative Development Internat. .25
Aid to Artisans .21
Air Serv Internat. .36
ALM Internat. 8.35
America’s Development Found. .49
America-Mideast Educational and Training Services 1.12
American Dentists for Foreign Service .34
American Inst. for Free Labor Development 2.18
American Jewish Joint Distribution Comm. 72.87
American Near East Refugee Aid 1.57
American ORT Federation 7.53
American Red Magen David for Israel 6.88
American Refugee Comm. 1.13
AmeriCares Found.* 61.71
Andean Rural Health Care .53
Asia Found. 12.06
Books for the World .07
Brother’s Brother Found.* 48.44
Catholic Near East Welfare Assoc. 15.87
Catholic Relief Services—USCC* 59.29
Center to Prevent Childhood Malnutrition .26
Centre for Development and Population Activities .98
Children Internat.* 27.86
Chol-Chol Found. .17
Christian Children’s Fund* 97.00
Compassion Internat.* 39.27
Conservation Internat. Found. 12.26
Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere* 88.88
Coordination in Development 1.07
Found. for Peoples of the South Pacific/Counterpart Found. .63
Dental Health Internat. .09
Direct Relief Internat. 10.99
Esperanca 1.62
Family Health Internat. .71
Florida Assoc. of Voluntary Agencies for Caribbean Action .27
Food for the Hungry* 23.41
Food for the Poor 7.79
Found. for Internat. Community Assistance .37
Friends of the Shanta Bhawan .04
Global Health Action .69
Global Hunger Project 8.33





Health Volunteers Overseas 2.77
Helen Keller Internat. 3.18
Indus. Medical Found. .37
Inst. for Development Research .23
Inst. of Internat. Education 87.32
Interchurch Medical Assistance 16.65
Internat. Child Care USA .50
Internat. Executive Service Corps 25.3
Internat. Eye Found. 1.74
Internat. Inst. of Rural Reconstruction 1.11
Internat. Lifeline 1.47
Internat. Planned Parenthood Federation, Western Hemisphere
Region 4.39
Internat. Rescue Comm.* 9.81
Internat. Voluntary Services .88
Katalysis North/South Development Partnership .32
Lions Club Internat. Found. 16.12
Lutheran World Relief 17.89
MAP Internat.* 43.28
Medical Teams Internat. 5.20
Mennonite Central Comm.* 26.58
Mercy Corps Internat.* 10.95
Mercy Ships 6.44
Minnesota Internat. Health Volunteers .15
National Cooperative Business Assoc. .05
Near East Found. .65
New Israel Fund 6.05
OBOR .07
Operation Bootstrap Africa .20
Opportunities Industrialization Centers Internat. 1.11
Opportunity Internat. 1.87
Our Little Brothers and Sisters 5.99
Outreach Internat. .79
Pan American Development Found. 5.88
Partners of the Americas 1.89
Pathfinder Internat. 1.82
Pearl S. Buck Found. 4.28
People-to-People Health Found. 36.33
Phelps-Stokes Fund 1.90
Plan Internat. USA* 28.42
Polish American Congress Charitable Found. 21.31
Population Services Internat. .62
Private Agencies Collaborating Together .29
Program for Appropriate Technology in Health 4.39
Project Concern Internat. 6.13
Project ORBIS Internat. 6.57
Rizal/MacArthur Memorial Found. .03
Rotary Found. of Rotary Internat.* 76.12
Salvadoran American Found. 5.82
Save the Children Federation* 44.24
Share and Care Found. for India .88
Sovereign Military Order of Malta, Federal Assoc., U.S.A. 1.31






Thomas A. Dooley Found./INTERMED—USA .71
Tom Dooley Heritage .10
Town Affiliation Assoc. of the United States .49
Trickle-Up Program .69
United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia 1.31
United Palestinian Appeal .85
United Ukrainian American Relief Comm. .46
United Way Internat. 1.02
U.S. Comm. for UNICEF* 28.39
Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance 2.21
Volunteers in Technical Assistance .52
Winrock Internat. Inst. for Agricultural Development 5.21
World Concern Development Org. 12.99
World Education .76
World Emergency Relief 7.26
World Learning 2.46
World Rehabilitation Fund .69
World Relief Corp. 7.18
World Resources Inst. 2.69
World Vision Relief and Development* 202.30
World Wildlife Fund* 32.83
Note.—Average annual private contributions are reported in millions of constant 1992 dollars.
* Organization appeared in Money’s 1992 list of 100 large charities.
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